SEcure Cloud computing for CRitical Infrastructure IT



Exploitation Plans

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






How we worked...





Everything goes as a service...






- Outsource hardware-related maintenance tasks
- Ease the deployment and of new functionalities by taking advantage of cloud elasticity
- Implement effective serverbackup policies
- Enhance resilience and minimize service downtime

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- Develop the Traffic Management System as a SaaS
- Lower budget and rapid availability









 New actors playing. Cloud provider and ISP



 Risks to cyber attacks have been increased (broad network exposure)

The SECCRIT Threat and Vulnerability Catalogue



Table 7: Rapid elasticity-related vulnerabilities and

- Organised items into categories NIST's essential characteristics of cloud computing at the core
- Identified impact type, i.e., CIA, and references when possible





Table 7: Rapid elasticity-related vulnerabilities and					
	Rapid Elasticity				
ID	Descript	Description			
RE-1 to 3	Insufficient underlying (1) compute, (2) network Vu and (3) storage resources for scaling-up				
RE-4 to 6	Insufficient underlying (1) compute, (2) network Vu and (3) storage resources for scaling-out			Vu	
RE-7	Scaling-out leads to performance issues be- Th				
	cause networ	Table 10: Organisational issues-re			
DE 0	are not		Orga	anisatio	
RE-8	Scaling ciated	ID	Description		
RE-9 Scaling	Scaling	OI-1	Malicious insiders in the provider	cloud in	
RE-10	or malf	OI-2	Poor information security by the cloud infrastructure		
	data ce	OI-3	Inadequate incident-response processes by the cloud infra	onse m	
RE-11	Failure cloud d gration	OI-4	Issues emerging because of cation		
RE-12	Virtual cepted infrastr EU.	OI-5	Contractual issues that emerge to bankruptcy and potential switching		
		OI-6	Failure of a sub-contractor, which the primary "obligor," i.e., a cloud in provider		
RE-13	Redune to the siject to si	OI-7	Vulnerabilities emerging fro of software versions and Al		
DE 11	1.1		Paduation of in house even	rtico cou	

Once in the cloud...





- Measures against cyberattacks
- Mechanisms to control
 - Cloud provider fulfillment of the SLA
 - ISP fulfillment of the SLA

SECCRIT OUTCOMES





resilience framework including



techno-legal guidance




tools for audit trails and root cause analysis



policy specification, decision and enforcement





risk assessment

cloud assurance profile




 Allow translation of high level availability requirements (as stated in the SLA) into low level policies that the framework can implement and monitor

	- D ×			
PAP Machine-readable Policy				
	Generate Machine-readable Policy			
Critical VM Migration VM Network Connection Virtual Machine CPU Load	If the average CPU load of the DB server exceeds 80% for 3 timesteps, then			
	✓ notify manueLrudolph@ie via email			
	urite a log entry			
	Increase the amount of CPUs by one, if the load is still to high after 6 timesteps, and inform @less.fraunhofer.de			
	☑ notify @jese.traunhofer.de via email if the load is low again for 3 timesteps			
	show notification on demo UI			
	. One timesteps represents 10 seconds 👻			

Archivo Qpciones Vista Procesos Rendimiento Usuarios I	CDU			
100% 2,53 GHz	CPU Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5649 @ 2.53GHz			
 Memoria 2,6/3,0 GB (87%) 				
C Ethernet E 40,0 Kbps R: 32,0 Kbps	$\overline{\mathbf{A}}$			
	60 regrandes 0 Una Valancidad Valancidad mixima 100% 2,53 GHz Socketz Processor Socketz Processor 200 32123 Cachel 11: 1-mergo action 1 111:15:50:50			
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


- Allow independent view of logs and events information
- Disruption of service results on a fine (SLA)
- How to prove what went wrong when you are in the cloud?





 Monitor pre-defined parameters of the cloud (network traffic, storage usage...) and trigger alerts in the event of a deviation of the normal behavior of the system



resilience framework including anomaly detection in the cloud




• **Continuous assessment** of security properties across the cloud architecture

Class	Security Property Name
	System/Service Integrity
INTEGRITY	Information Consistency
	Error Correction
	Password rotation
CONFIDENTIALITY	Concurrent Session Control
	Strong encryption




cloud assurance profile







- We have a central element to gather all information
- Support tool for IT equipment
- Information correlation among SECCRIT tools with ETRA applications



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Thanks for your attention

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